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This dissertation is composed of three essays. The first essay, “A Particle Swarm 
Optimization Algorithm (PSO) for Agent-Based Artificial Markets,” adapts PSO to 
simulate dynamic economic games and compares the robustness and speed of the PSO 
algorithm to a genetic algorithm (GA) in a Cournot oligopsony market. Artificial agents 
with the PSO learning algorithm find the optimal strategies that are predicted by theory. 
PSO is simpler and more robust to changes in algorithm parameters than GA. PSO also 
converges faster and gives more precise answers than the GA method which was used by 
some previous economic studies. The agent-based model is a suitable tool to study 
complex economic problems that are hard to solve with analytical methods and it is also 
new to agricultural economics. 
The second essay, “Collusion and Competition of Oligopsony Firms with 
Quantity-Price Strategic Decisions: An Agent-Based Artificial Market,” uses an agent-
based model to determine market equilibrium with price-setting firms in oligopsony 
markets. With price setting firms, the Bertrand solution is perfect competition and the 
Bertrand-Edgeworth model has a mixed strategy solution in which firms keep on 
changing prices. But experiments with human subjects find the market equilibrium varies 
with the number of firms in the industry. In our simulation, the learning of agents is 
modeled with the particle swarm optimization algorithm. The results show that with one 
or two firms prices are at the monopsony level and with four firms prices are always at 
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the perfectly competitive level. The triopsony market, however, changes from mostly 
monopsony to perfect competition when capacity cost increases from zero to a higher 
level. The results also show that firms tend to have excess capacity. The results are 
similar to results observed in experiments with human subjects. This suggests that people 
use the heuristic rules assumed in the agent-based model rather being fully rational as 
assumed in the traditional Bertrand and Bertrand-Edgeworth models.  
The third essay, “The Long Run and Short Run Impact of Captive Supplies on 
Spot Market Price: An Agent-Based Artificial Market,” uses an agent-based model to 
determine the impact of captive supplies under short run and long run assumptions in the 
fed cattle market. In the simulated market, packers purchase cattle from feeders with both 
exclusive captive supply contracts and in the spot market. The price of captive contracts 
is linked to the spot market price. The captive contracts are fixed in the short run but 
flexible in the long run. Simulation results indicate that packers can depress the spot 
market price in the short run if the contracts are fixed. This result matches Xia and 
Sexton’s model. But, this is a short run effect. In the long run when the packers can adjust 
the number of captive supply contracts and feeders have a supply response for contract 
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A PARTICLE SWARM OPTIMIZATION ALGORITHM FOR AGENT-BASED 
ARTIFICIAL MARKETS 
Introduction 
Agent-based models are increasingly used to study economic phenomena and are 
especially suitable to simulate economic games in which agents interact with each other 
with bounded rationality and adaptive learning rules. Work to date has shown that such 
models can obtain the same results as theoretical models (Arifovic 1994; Alkemade, 
Poutre, and Amman 2006). Agent-based models offer considerable potential to study 
auctions and market mechanism designs as well as more traditional industrial 
organization topics. They have the potential to study much more complex economic 
problems than can be analyzed theoretically, such as markets containing heterogeneous 
agents, or agents using combinatorial strategies. They also have a potentially much lower 
cost than experimental markets with human subjects.  
To date, however, the complexity of the agent-based models has been limited. 
One limitation of these models is the time it takes to find an optimum, the others are the 
algorithm complexity and robustness to algorithm parameters. Previous research using 
agent-based models in economics have used either a genetic algorithm (GA) (Arifovic 
1994 and 1996; Axelrod 1987; Bullard and Duffy 1999; Riechmann 2001; Vriend 2000) 
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or reinforcement learning (RL) (Erev and Roth 1998; Kutschinski, Uthmann, and Polani 
2003). With GA, researchers have to be very careful to choose parameters and methods 
for each problem or it may cause premature convergence. The large population size 
required also makes GA slow to find equilibrium. RL is a sub-area of machine learning 
and the environment is typically formulated as a finite-state Markov decision process in 
which an agent increases the probability of choosing successful strategies under the 
possible strategy spaces of its rivals. When the possible strategy space is large or 
continuous, the computational cost increases exponentially. To avoid the problems of GA 
and RL, we use a particle swarm optimization (PSO) to model the learning behavior of 
agents.  
PSO is a stochastic optimization technique developed by Eberhart and Kennedy 
(1995). The idea of PSO came from watching the way flocks of birds, fish or other 
animals adapt to avoid predators and find food by sharing information. In PSO, a set of 
randomly generated solutions moves towards the optimal solution over a number of 
iterations by assimilating and sharing information among all members of the swarm.  
PSO has been shown to have the same ability to find a global optimum as genetic 
algorithms, but to be able to find optimums faster than genetic algorithms (Panda and 
Padhy 2007; Mouser and Dunn 2005; Hassan et al. 2005). Existing PSO methods, 
however, cannot be directly applied to solving agent-based models. With an agent-based 
model, all agents solve their own optimization problems under a dynamic economic 
environment since an agent’s profit depends on the actions of other agents.  
The objective of this essay is to adapt PSO to solve an agent-based model under a 
dynamic environment with non-cooperative agents. We also compare the proposed PSO 
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algorithm to a genetic algorithm for finding equilibrium in the Cournot oligopsony 
market.   
 
Theoretical Model of Oligopsony Market 
The Cournot oligopsony market describes a situation where a few buyers compete 
in a market and each of them can influence the market price through a common price 
supply curve. In this situation, buyers must make strategic decisions, taking into account 
the decisions of their rivals. 
Consider a homogeneous product market with M buyers and N  sellers. The 
number of buyers is much less than the number of sellers ( NM << ). Assume that buyers 
process products that will be sold in the retail market and the marginal cost for processing 
is constant for all processors. The marginal value equals the selling price minus the 
marginal processing cost. To focus our research on the games between buyers and sellers 
in this market, we assume the final product price P and the marginal processing cost mc 
are constant. Thus the value of product before processing mcPR −= is also constant. 
Each firm uses processing ratio as its choice variable:  
(1.1)                                        )/( NRqx dii ×= , 
here ix is the processing ratio, 
d
iq is the processing quantity of the firm and it also defines 
the amount of  procurement, R is the marginal revenue of product and also the supply 
level of sellers under the perfect competition price level, N is the total number of sellers. 
For example, if under perfect competition market all sellers will provide 10,000 products 
and the processing quantity of processor i is 3,000, its processing ratio ix equals 0.3. 




iqD 1 . 
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 At the beginning of each processing period, buyers make procurement strategies x  
simultaneously. We assume all sellers are homogeneous and have supply 
function pq sj = , so the total supply is NpS = . The total demand of buyers will determine 
the market price together with the aggregate supply of sellers and the market price 
is NDp = . In the simulation market, there are 4 buyers and 100 sellers, R equals $100. 
According to theory, under perfect competition, the market price is $100, the aggregate 
supply is 10,000 and the processing ratio is 25% for each firm; if the market reaches 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the market price equals $80 and the processing ratio is 20% 
for each firm.  
 
Particle Swarm Optimization Algorithm 
This research adjusts PSO for a non-cooperative game by constructing multiple 
parallel markets and letting each agent have its own clones in every market. This means 
each agent has a separate “flock of birds” that does not share information with the flocks 
of other agents. The asynchronous best strategies of one agent in every parallel structure 
are called local best solutions and the best fit strategy among all parallel structures at the 
current simulation iteration is called the global best solution.  
Each firm has its clones in every parallel market and these clones trade 
independently and simultaneously in all markets. We can look at this setting as firms 
separate the sellers into groups or a longer time into multiple periods and try different 
strategies within each group or period. This kind of marketing strategy can be observed in 
many real markets. For example in fed cattle markets, packing firms send many agents to 
purchase cattle from feeders and each of them visits feeders in a certain area. Agents bid 
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differently but they will share information at the end of each period and adjust their 
strategies to increase profit. In real world markets, the dynamics of market prices are 
mostly path dependent which means the market prices only change a small value each 
time. So the adaptive feature of PSO is similar to actual learning behavior.  
Since agents are continuously changing their strategies, the pervious local best 
solutions may not be the best for the current period. Thus, we adjust PSO by retesting the 
historical best locals of each agent under the current market environment and choose the 
best fit strategies as the current best locals. Every agent continuously uses its own PSO 
algorithm searching for better solutions in each parallel market guided by their own best 
local and global solutions.  
 
PSO Algorithm Description 
We set up K parallel markets and letting the M buyers each have their own clones 
in every market. Although having the same behavior rules, one agent and its K clones 
may take different market strategies since the initialized random values are different. In 
the simulation, buyers dynamically change their marketing strategies with the PSO 
algorithm but their sellers are price takers and simply sell their products to the current 
highest bidders.  
The clone of firm i in the thk  parallel market has a quantity ratio 
value ]1,0[, ∈kix as a strategy parameter, and each strategy parameter is randomly 
selected from a )1,0(U distribution at the beginning of the simulation. Each clone has an 
evolutionary velocity, ]1,1[, +−∈kiv , which determines the change of its strategy. The 
changes of the clones’ strategies are influenced by the location of the best solutions 
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k clone, and by the whole population, ]1,0[∈gip . 
The superscripts l and g indicate local and global, the subscripts k and 
i indicate thk parallel market and thi firm respectively. Profit function )( , kik xπ  is used to 
value the performance of each strategy kix , . 
In every simulation step, the strategy of the thi firm in the thk parallel market is 
updated by the following equations: 
(1.2)                                        tkitkitki vxx ,,,,1,, +=+ , 




tkitkitki xpucxpucvwv −+−+⋅=+ , 
where tkix ,, is the procurement ratio in period t, tkiv ,, is the velocity vector, 
]1,0[∈ju , 2,1=j are uniformly distributed random numbers, 1c and 2c are learning  
parameters and can be called self confidence factor and swarm confidence factor 
respectively, and w is an inertia weight factor.  
The following equations indicate how to choose l tkip ,,  and 
g
tip , among all 
parameters of firm i . In economic games, the payoff of one agent’s strategy is also 
determined by the strategies of its rivals and the changing of its rivals’ behaviors forms 
the dynamic economic environment of this agent. This may cause the agent’s previous 
best local strategies not perform well in the current period. Thus we reevaluate an agent’s 
best strategy by using its L previous best locals to trade versus other agents’ current 
period strategies and compare their payoffs with that of its current strategy, and then 
choose the best among them as the best local of the current period. This procedure can be 
written as: 
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(1.4)           { }tkiitkikl Ltkikl tkikl tki xxppp ,,',,,,1,,,, )(),(),......,(maxarg ≠−−= πππ , 
where 'i indicates firm i ’s rivals. The best global is selected from the best local 
parameters: 
(1.5)                        { })(,),(),(maxarg ,,2,,21,,1, l tKiKl til tigti pppp πππ K= , 
where Kk ,...,2,1= and K is the total number of parallel markets. 
 Chatterjee and Siarry (2006) state that the inertia weight w in (1.3) is critical for 
the convergence behavior of PSO. A large inertia weight provides a larger exploration but 
a smaller one is needed to fine-tune the current search area. So it is worth making a 
compromise, e.g. start w with a higher initial weight at the beginning and then decrease it 
with iterations: 
(1.6)                                        ( ) maxmax10 / tttw
ww
t −+= ββ , 
where both w0β and
w
1β are constants, maxt is the maximum number of iterations in one 
simulation round and t indicates the current iteration. The self confidence factor 1c and 
swarm confidence factor 2c  in equation (1.3) are set as:  
(1.7)                                        ( ) maxmax10,2,1 /11 tttcc
cc
tt −+== ββ , 
where both 10
cβ and 11
cβ are constants.  
 
Summary of Simulation Procedure with PSO 
In the Cournot oligopsony game, buyers select independently and simultaneously 
the quantity they produce. The total supplies along with the demand curve determine the 
retail price. There are K parallel markets. The M buyers act as independent agents and 
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trade in each market at the same time. Each firm may have a different trading strategy in 
each parallel market. The steps are as follows: 
(i) For the first L beginning iterations, randomly initialize strategy set x for all 
buyers in every parallel market. We choose the quantity ratio ]1,0[,, Ux tki ∈  
and the movement velocities 0,, =tkiv for Mi ,...,1= , Kk ,...,1= , 
and Lt ,...,1= . 
(ii) Buyers update their strategies with equations (1.2) and (1.3). 
(iii) After the first L iterations, each buyer retest the past L best locals under 
current economic environment and compare their performance with that of 
the current strategy, the best among them is chosen as the new best local, as 
equation (1.4) shows. 
(iv) Following equation (1.5), the best fit among all best locals is the best global.  
(v) If the market does not reach equilibrium, go to step (ii). 
 
Genetic Algorithm 
GA is a general-purpose optimization method based loosely on Darwinian 
principles of biological evolution, reproduction and the survival of the fittest (Goldberg 
1989). GA maintains a pool of candidate solutions called a population and repeatedly 
modifies them. At each step, the GA selects candidates from the current population to be 
parents and uses them to produce children for the next generation. Over successive 
generations, the population evolves toward an optimal solution. The GA is well suited to 
and has been extensively applied to solve complex design optimization problems because 
it can handle both discrete and continuous variables, as well as nonlinear objective and 
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constraint functions. The recent GA study by Alkemade, Poute and Amman (2006) 
indicates that to avoid premature convergence of the evolutionary algorithm, each agent 
should have a large population of strategies from which agents can choose.  
 
Genetic Algorithm Operators and Parameters 
In this GA, a strategy of each firm can be represented with a chromosome which 
contains information about this strategy. The most used way of encoding is a binary 
string. We use B bit binary strings to encode strategies and the bits can be looked at as 
genes. Each firm has a population of K chromosomes, represents a collection of its 
strategies at time period t. The thk strategy of firm i  in period t can be stated with a string 
of length B as: 








here { }1,0,, ∈
b
tkia  taken at the b
th position in the string, }...,,2,1{ Bb∈ , and can be decoded 
into a decimal integer using 









,,,, )2( . 









max 2 . After choosing one active strategy tkid ,, , the firm’s 
procurement ratio can be calculated with max,,,, / ddx tkitki = . For example, if a string 
contains 4 bits, a binary code “0101” can be decoded to decimal value 
=id 521202120
0123 =⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅ , and the maximum binary code of this string “1111” 
can be decoded to value 15max =d . Thus a firm using “0101” as its strategy means its 
procurement ratio is %3015/5/ max,,,, === ddx tkitki . Since the larger the string length, 
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the more accurate the procurement ratio, we use 15 bits as the string length in the 
simulation. 
Buyers’ decision rules are updated using four genetic operators, elitism, 
reproduction, crossover, and mutation. Elitism can very rapidly increase performance of 
GA, because it prevents losing the best found solution to date (De Jong, 1975). In our 
Cournot game, the profit difference between strategies could be very big. To avoid one 
high profit strategy dominating the next generation with profit proportional selection, 
ranking selection is used as the reproduction method.  
 
Elitism copies a few of the best strategies from the current K strategies to the new 
population with an elitism rateε . If %10=ε and 100=K , this means the 10 best 
strategies are copied from the old population to the new one. The rest are chosen with 
linear ranking selection.  
 
Reproduction chooses chromosomes as parents from the old strategy population. 
In this research, we use ranking selection methods. It ranks an agent’s strategies in its 
population 1 to K from worst to best according to their profit (K = population size). If 
more than one strategy has the same profit, they are randomly ranked. The selection 
probabilities of the strategies kx    (k =1,…,K) are given by  













xp kk , 
where p is the probability of strategies being chosen as new ones, 2minmax =+ rr , and 
21 max ≤≤ r . We choose maxr = 1.1 and minr = 0.9 and it is easy to see ∑ )( kxp  equals 1. 
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Crossover selects genes from two parent chromosomes and creates a new 
strategy. All new strategies selected with elitism and ranking selection methods are 
randomly matched as a group of parent chromosomes. For each pair of parents, the 
crossover is performed with a probability χ . The crossover randomly chooses an 
across point of the chromosome string, and bits before and after this point are 
exchanged for both chromosomes to generate new ones. Crossover can look like this (| 
is the crossover point): 
Chromosome 1 11000 | 1011010100 
Chromosome 2 10010 | 1101000001 
New Chromosome 1 10010 | 1011010100 
New Chromosome 2 11000 | 1101000001 
 
Mutation takes place after a crossover is performed with a probabilityµ . This 
operator is to prevent falling into a local optimum. In the binary encoding method, 
mutation changes the bits of the new strategy from 1 to 0 or 0 to 1 with the mutation 
rate µ .    
Like PSO, we can also use niching methods in GA, the function of parameters for 
three operators are 
(1.11)                                        max10 / ttt ⋅+=
εε ββε , 
(1.12)                                        ( ) maxmax10 / tttt −⋅+=
χχ ββχ , 
(1.13)                                        ( ) maxmax10 / tttt −⋅+=
µµ ββµ , 
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here tε , tχ  and tµ indicate elitism, crossover and mutation rate, β s are constant, maxt  is 
the number of maximum iterations of the one simulation round.  
 
GA Simulation Procedure for Cournot Market 
At the beginning of the simulation, buyers randomly generate strategies as new 
rules in the starting population. Every strategy in the population is randomly chosen to 
trade in the market. A new population is generated from the current one with following 
procedure. First, Sε highest strategies are copied to the new population as elites. 
Then S)1( ε− strategies are chosen with ranking selection methods from the whole 
population of the old generation, and are randomly matched and crossed over. Mutation 
operation is performed for the new strategies except the elites. Figure 1 gives the outline 
of the program.  
 
Comparison of Algorithm Performance 
In this research, we use the Cournot game with known Nash equilibrium to 
evaluate the performance of PSO and GA. We also define the algorithm convergence 
criterion in this section. We design 12 parameter settings for PSO and GA respectively 
under three categories, fixed and changing algorithm parameters, and different algorithm 
structures. 
One simulation round contains multiple iterations and agents trade with each 
other repeatedly. Within these periods, agents use PSO or GA to update their strategies 
based on their rivals’ strategies. Considering the randomness of the learning path, under 
each setting we run the Cournot game for 20 rounds with different random initialized 
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strategies and the game is repeated for 400 iterations per round to see the learning 
behavior of agents and the equilibrium under each set.  
 
Algorithm Convergence Criteria 
Zero diversity in the population's strategy values signals the stopping point for 
GA and PSO. For every agent, if the variance of the strategies in the population is less 
than 0.01% and the variance of the mean value of the strategies for 10 generations is less 
than 0.01%, we say the algorithm reaches equilibrium. Considering the feature of 
mutation of GA, we delete 5% of the strategies that have the largest difference from the 
mean when calculating the mean and variance for GA.  
 
Robustness Analysis 
Robustness to small variations in the technical parameter settings (that have no 
clear economic meaning) is particularly important in agent-based models. It is important 
that results are valid for a wide range of parameter settings. 
PSO and GA are nondeterministic and are not guaranteed to return to the same 
solution in each run. The speed and accuracy of the algorithms can vary depending on the 
chosen parameters. We test robustness of the conclusions by comparing the performance 
under alternative algorithm parameters, population size and retest times, which are listed 




Hamm, Brorsen, and Hagan (2007) recommend using multiple sets of starting 
values when using genetic algorithms. Thus for each set of algorithm parameters, we run 
20 times with different randomly generated initial strategies and then calculate the mean 
and standard deviation of the market price and players’ procurement ratios at the 20 
equilibrium points.  
 
Robustness Analysis 
We compare the performance of the PSO and GA with three categories: fixed 
algorithm parameters, changing algorithm parameters and different algorithm structure 
parameters. In each setting in the fixed algorithm category, we use constant values for the 
algorithm parameters, ( w , 1c , and 2c for PSO, ε , χ ,and µ for GA). In each setting of the 
changing algorithm category, the algorithm parameters are changing with time as shown 
in equations (1.6), (1.7), and (1.11) to (1.13). Under our design of the market, 
theoretically the Nash equilibrium of market price is $80 and the procurement ratio for 
each buyer is 20%. These values are used to evaluate the performance of the algorithm. 
Table I-2 gives the simulation results under fixed algorithm settings. For PSO, all 
settings give near Nash equilibrium solutions with low variances. For GA, all four 
settings give a near Nash equilibrium market price but buyers may have heterogeneous 
strategies at the market equilibrium. 
Table I-3 presents the results of the changing algorithm parameter settings. PSO 
gives near Nash equilibrium results for all 4 settings with a small standard deviation. The 
settings of GA do not show much difference from the fixed algorithm parameter settings. 
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Table I-4 shows the results with different algorithm structures. For both PSO and GA, the 
large population size gives a better performance, but PSO is not as sensitive as GA to the 
algorithm structure changes. PSO settings with both large and small population size give 
near Nash equilibrium results for market price and buyers’ strategies with small 
differences. GA settings with small population size show bigger differences in buyers’ 
strategies. 
For both PSO and GA with changing parameters, programs need less machine 
time and iterations to reach equilibrium than with fixed algorithm parameters. And GA 
generally uses around 15 to 80 fold more machine time than PSO. This is because GA 
needs coding and decoding of binary string bits and additional evaluation and calculation 
for the ranking and roulette selection.  
From the above analysis, the overall performance of PSO is considerably faster 
and more precise than GA and less sensitive to the value of parameters.  
 
Individual Runs 
After analyzing the overall results, we also choose the best performance parameter 
set of PSO and GA out of all settings in both fixed and changing parameter category, 
draw the figure of one individual simulation run for each of them to illustrate how the 
buyers find the best response strategies during the dynamic environment and how the 
markets reach the equilibrium. 
We choose the best performance parameter sets from fixed and changing 
categories for each algorithm, which are sets 2 and 7 in Table I-2 and 12 and 14 in Table 
I-3. Then we illustrate the evolution of market price level with figures under each setting, 
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as Figure I-2 (a) and (b) show. In this example, both GA and PSO reach equilibrium at 
about the same time. The GA continues to mutate as the iterations proceed, but the 
mutations are quickly discarded.  
When looking at the individual agent’s marketing strategies, we found that with 
the PSO algorithm, agents in the markets tend to have the same strategy under market 
equilibrium, which is predicted in theory, while GA shows that individuals could have 
different strategies, as Figures I-2 and I-3 show. The difference can be explained by the 
learning methods adopted by the two algorithms. In GA, if the strategy population of one 
firm converges faster then others and others continue to adjust their strategies, the market 
results in equilibrium with heterogeneous strategies. Different from GA, besides 
considering the historical performance, global best in the parallel market is also taken 
into account in PSO, so one firm has little probability to take a larger market share than 
others. Then the equilibrium of PSO usually contains homogenous strategies of agents.  
Similarly, the quantity levels shown in Figures I-2 and I-3 show the much faster 
convergence of PSO relative to GA.   
 
Summary and Conclusions 
This paper adapts PSO to simulate agent-based models by allowing each agent to 
have its own parallel structures and learn from them. We also compare the proposed PSO 
algorithm to a genetic algorithm for finding equilibrium in the Cournot oligopsony 
market.  
 We find that with trial and error, artificial agents using PSO learning algorithm 
can learn to play the best response strategies as theory predicts. PSO needs few 
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parameters and the simulation results are more robust to changing parameters than GA. 
The parameters of GA need to be carefully chosen to suit the specific simulation 
problem. It also requires parameter tuning for good performance and can sometimes be 
computationally expensive.  
The comparison is undertaken under a relatively simple economic market design. 
The reader is cautioned that the generalizability of the results is not known. There are 
thousands of variations on genetic algorithms that have been suggested. The performance 
of both PSO and GA can depend on the parameters used. But, for the problem considered 
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Initialization {     
Every agent initializes the starting strategy population pool by 
randomly drawing S strategies; 
Assign monopoly profit as relative payoff. 
} 
 
For each generation do { 
For each agent {Randomly choose its active strategy from the 
population} 
Play the Cournot game; 
Calculate and store payoff for the current active strategy. 
} until all strategies are played. 
 
Update algorithm operators or parameters if needed; 
 
Generate new population from the old one{ 
    Choose Sε strategies with highest profit as elites;     
    Choose S)1( ε− strategies with ranking selection methods; 
    Randomly match all the selected ones as parents, apply single crossover 
to them with rate χ , until get S)1( ε− number strategies, and apply 
mutation to them; 
    These S)1( ε− strategies combine with elites to form the new population. 
} 
 
If not converged, go back to step 2;  
End; 
 





(a) With fixed algorithm parameters 
 
 
(b) With changing algorithm parameters 
 
Figure I-2. Market price level 
 
Note:  






cβ ] = [0.4, 1, 1]; parameter set 
for GA is [ε , χ , µ ] = [ εβ0 ,
χβ0 ,
µβ0 ] = [10%, 76%, 0.33%] and slopes in equations 
(1.11) to (1.13) are zeros. 
2. In (b), parameter set for PSO is [ 111 ,
cw ββ ] = [0.5, 1]; parameter set for GA is 
[ εβ1 ,
χβ1 ,
µβ1 ] = [10%.76%, 0.33%] and intercepts in equations (1.11) to (1.13) are 
zeros, [ εβ0 ,
χβ0 ,







Figure I-3. Quantity level with fixed algorithm parameters 






cβ ] = [0.4, 1, 1]; parameter set for 
GA is [ε , χ , µ ] = [ εβ0 ,
χβ0 ,
µβ0 ] = [10%, 76%, 0.33%] and slopes in equations (1.11) to 







Figure I-4. Quantity level with changing algorithm parameters 
 
Note: Parameter set for PSO is [ 111 ,
cw ββ ] = [0.5, 1]; parameter set for GA is 
[ εβ1 ,
χβ1 ,
µβ1 ] = [10%, 76%, 0.33%] and intercepts in equations (1.11) to (1.13) are zeros, 
[ εβ0 ,
χβ0 ,




Table I-1. Parameters for PSO and GA in the Cournot Oligopsony Simulations  
 
PSO parameters GA parameters 
  
Number of parallel markets: K Strategy population size: K 
Number of retest local best parameters: L Loop per iteration: L  
Inertia weight: ( ) maxmax10 / tttw
ww
t −+= ββ  String bit: B  
Local confidence factor: ( ) maxmax10,1 11 tttc
cc
t −+= ββ  Elitism rate: max10 / ttt ⋅+=
εε ββε  
Global confidence factor: ( ) maxmax10,2 22 tttc
cc
t −+= ββ  Crossover rate: ( ) maxmax10 / tttt −⋅+=
χχ ββχ  
 Mutation rate:  ( ) maxmax10 / tttt −+=
µµ ββµ  






Table I-2. PSO and GA Simulation Results with Fixed Algorithm Parameters 
 
       Capacity Ratio   
Set Parameters  Statistic Market 
Price($) 





PSO w c1 c2          
1 0.4 1.5 1.5  Mean 81.82 21.32% 21.54% 20.30% 19.86% 294 N/A 
     SD   1.16   0.49%   0.53%   0.43%   0.53%   32  
2 0.4 1 1  Mean 80.00 20.00% 20.01% 19.99% 20.00% 230 66 
     SD   0.00   0.01% 0.01%   0.00%   0.00%   27   6 
3 0.4 0.5 0.5  Mean 80.06 20.21% 21.32% 19.51% 19.10% 228 286 
     SD   0.46   0.76%   0.93%   0.67%   1.10%   22 149 
4 0.1 1 1  Mean 80.01 20.00% 20.09% 19.98% 19.95% 280 121 
     SD   0.06   0.14%   0.18%   0.06%   0.08% 116 101 
GA ε  χ  µ           
5 10.00% 80.00% 1.00%  Mean 83.38 19.53% 25.53% 19.33% 18.98% 4,780 N/A 
     SD   2.23   3.75%  3.35%   3.91%   3.93%    719  
6 0.00% 80.00% 0.33%  Mean 79.58 12.32% 20.77% 25.33% 21.13% 5,401 N/A 
     SD   1.65   3.28%  2.68%   4.57%   2.93% 2,081  
7 10.00% 76.00% 0.33%  Mean 79.58 18.70% 21.92% 20.23% 18.70% 5,539 398 
     SD   1.76   3.27%  3.03%   2.60%   3.40% 1,051    9 
8 30.00% 56.00% 0.33%  Mean 78.17 12.50% 25.01% 18.75% 21.91% 4,979 252 
     SD   2.50   7.83%  4.25%  4.42% 3.47% 1,146 104 




Table I-3. PSO and GA Simulation Results with Changing Algorithm Parameters 
 
       Capacity Ratio   
Set Parameters  Statistic 
Market 
Price($) 











β            
9 0.98 2.5   Mean 80.01 19.99% 20.00% 20.00% 20.04% 290 150 
     SD   0.02   0.01%   0.02%   0.03%   0.02%   66     7 
10 0.98 0.5   Mean 80.00 19.99% 20.00% 20.02% 20.00% 255    88 
     SD 0.01   0.01%   0.02%   0.02%   0.02%   20     9 
11 0.5 1   Mean 80.00 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 324    59 
     SD 0.00   0.02%   0.01%   0.03%   0.01% 159    14 
12 0.2 1   Mean 80.02 20.32% 19.99% 19.85% 19.87% 241    80 






 µβ1           
13 10.00% 86.00% 0.33%  Mean 81.29 18.95% 18.55% 25.02% 18.76% 3,854 170 
     SD   1.33   3.12%   3.12%   3.38%   3.79%    305    22 
14 20.00% 66.00% 1.00%  Mean 80.18 20.01% 18.75% 19.53% 21.88% 4,037 188 
     SD   0.83   2.18%   2.28%   2.43%   2.56%    356   11 
15 40.00% 76.00% 1.00%  Mean 79.95 19.25% 18.55% 17.06% 25.08% 4,650   96 
     SD   1.37   2.34%   3.75%   3.97%   2.90%    998     8 
16 40.00% 66.00% 0.33%  Mean 80.07 20.33% 20.32% 19.93% 19.48% 4,348 154 
     SD   0.62   1.87%   2.26%   2.65%   1.12%    595     20 
Note:   
1. For PSO, the parallel market size for PSO is 20. For GA, the population size is 40 and the bit length is 15. 





cβ in equations (1.6) and (1.7) are chosen as constant value 0.5 and 1 respectively. 
3. For GA, the intercepts
εβ0 , 
χβ0 and 





Table I-4. PSO and GA Simulations Results under Different Algorithm Structure  
 
       Capacity Ratio   
Set P L   Statistic 
Market  
Price($) 
Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Buyer 3 Buyer 4 Machine Time Equilibrium Iteration 
PSO             
17 20 10   Mean 79.99 20.00% 19.99% 20.03% 19.98% 434 60 
     SD   0.02   0.01%   0.04%   0.01%   0.01%   39 11 
18 10 3   Mean 79.99 19.97% 19.97% 20.04% 20.02% 122 76 
     SD   0.20   0.28%   0.38%   0.98%   0.23%   11 26 
19 3 3   Mean 79.77 20.24% 20.22% 19.10% 20.22%   45 80 
     SD   2.31   4.69%   5.04%   4.88%   1.93%   15 45 
GA             
20 100 100   Mean 79.70 20.30% 20.32% 18.74% 20.31% 35,805 172 
     SD 0.76 1.91% 1.40% 1.14% 1.86%   2,732   18 
21 40 40   Mean 78.93 21.09% 20.31% 25.00% 12.49%   4,131 150 
     SD 1.24 2.90% 2.84% 3.43% 2.35%     568   26 
22 20 40   Mean 78.01 21.32% 12.49% 21.97% 22.20%   1,838 121 
     SD 1.73 5.13% 3.67% 3.62% 4.21%     186   23 
Note: P indicates parallel markets number and population size for PSO and GA respectively, L indicates number of retest local best of 










COLLUSION AND COMPETITION OF OLIGOPSONY FIRMS                              
WITH QUANTITY-PRICE STRATEGIC DECISIONS:                                                      
AN AGENT-BASED ARTIFICIAL MARKET 
Introduction 
The classical Bertrand model states that for price setting firms, the Nash 
equilibrium is the perfect competition level and the solution does not depend on the 
number of firms. Edgeworth and his followers show that a capacity constraint can bind 
the price away from the competitive level (Levitan and Shubik 1972; Tasnadi 1999). 
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) propose a theoretical model and find that if firms decide 
quantity first then compete with price these firms perform like Cournot competition.  
In contrast to theoretical work, experiments with human subjects show prices 
deviating from perfect competition or even colluding to the monopoly level in duopoly 
and triopoly markets with or without a capacity constraints (Dufwenberg and Gneezy 
2000; Brandts and Guillen 2007). Brandts and Guillen design experiments by letting 
firms choose price and quantity simultaneously. For both duopoly and triopoly markets, 
Brandts and Guillen find that either competitors learn to collude at the monopoly level or 
only one firm survives, which results in a monopoly market. But since they assume the 
demand curve is “boxed-shaped” in that consumers will purchase products up to the 
maximum quantity if price is less than a fixed value, their results cannot differentiate 
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monopoly from Cournot. Suetens and Potters (2007) also find significantly more tacit 
collusion in Bertrand than in Cournot markets after reexamining experimental results of 
four previous studies (Fouraker and Siegel 1963; Huck, Normann, and Oechssler 2000; 
Davis 2002; Altavilla, Luini, and Sbriglia 2006). Huck, Normann and Oechssler (2000) 
find that experimental markets with more than three competitors are more likely to be 
competitive than oligopolistic.  
The Nash equilibrium of the Bertrand model assumes agents are rational. The 
concept of bounded rationality revises this assumption to account for the fact that 
perfectly rational decisions are often not feasible in practice due to the finite 
computational resources available for making them (Simon 1991). The departure of 
experimental results from the theoretical model implies that a specific learning algorithm 
needs to be employed to describe how agents make economic decisions. Lucas (1986) 
suggests that comparing the results of adaptive learning algorithms and experiments with 
human subjects may illustrate how people learn in a specific problem.  
To help explain the gap between the Bertrand theoretical predictions and 
experimental results, this research studies behavior of quantity-price competition firms 
with an agent-based computational model. Past research with agent-based models in 
economics uses genetic algorithms (GA) (Ariforic 1994 and 1996; Axelrod 1987; Vriend 
2000) and reinforcement leaning algorithm (RL) (Erev and Roth 1998; Kutschinski, 
Uthmann and Polani 2003). With GA, researchers have to be very careful to choose 
parameters and methods for each problem or it may cause premature convergence. The 
large population size required also makes GA slow to find equilibrium. RL is a sub-area 
of machine learning and the environment is typically formulated as a finite-state Markov 
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decision process in which an agent increases the probability of choosing successful 
strategies under the possible strategy spaces of its rivals. When the possible strategy 
space is large or continuous, the computational cost increases exponentially. 
To avoid the limitation of the above two algorithms, this study adopts the particle 
swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm to model the learning behavior of agents. PSO is a 
stochastic optimization technique developed by Eberhart and Kennedy (1995) and can be 
used for an economic optimization problem. Equilibrium is found for markets with one to 
four firms. Each firm operates in a set of parallel markets and each firm uses PSO to 
solve its own optimization problem. 
 
Description of Oligopsony Model 
A processing industry is used as an example. In a product supply chain, 
processing firms purchase input from many relatively small sellers and sell processed 
goods to a big retail market. Buyers have to decide both production capacity and 
procurement price strategy simultaneously in advance. Once their procurement prices are 
announced, sellers will choose to sell products to the current highest bidder. Buyers need 
to arrange other inputs before processing and the capacity is determined in advance and 
unchangeable in one production period, so the buyer will stop purchasing activity at the 
capacity point even if it can get more. Each seller has an upward sloping supply curve. 
We assume the demand curve is perfectly elastic so we can focus on the buyers’ trading 
behavior.  
Consider a homogeneous product market with M  buyers and N  sellers. The 
number of buyers is much less than the number of sellers ( NM << ). Assume that buyers 
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process products that will be sold in the retail market and the marginal cost for processing 
is the same for all processors. The marginal value equals the selling price minus the 
marginal processing cost. To focus on the games between buyers and sellers in this 
market, the final product price P and the marginal processing cost mc are constant and as 
a result the before processing value, mcPR −= , is also constant. There is a capacity cost 
and the cost is a constant value Cc for one additional unit of capacity.  
 Assume all sellers are homogeneous and have the linear supply function bq sj = . 
This means that the sellers sell their product to the current highest biding buyer with bid 
b and provide quantity sjq . If buyers are perfectly competitive, they will all bid 
C
cRb −=  for each product and get zero profit. Therefore CcR −  is also the supply 
quantity of each seller under buyers’ perfect competition condition. 
At the beginning of each processing period, buyers make combination 
strategies x ]',[ Cb xx=  simultaneously. The bids and prices are discrete and use cents as 
the minimum unit. The highest bidder gets the supply first up to its capacity. Then the 
next highest bidder makes the procurement and so on. If more than one buyer bids the 
highest price, they split the supply quantity until their capacity. For comparison 
convenience, we use price ratio and capacity ratio to indicate the buyers’ strategies. The 
price ratio of each buyer is 
 (2.1)                                        )/( Cb cRbx −= , 
where bx is defined as the bid price ratio, b is bid price, and R is the buyer’s marginal 
revenue. In some cases, buyers spend capacity cost to build a building, hire people, or 
arrange other materials in advance to meet the processing requirement besides mc. The 
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marginal capacity cost is Cc . For example, since the revenue R for one product is $100, if 
the capacity cost Cc for one product is $10, then the value of the product before 
processing is 90$=− CcR . Thus, when a buyer plans to use a bid price ratio of 50% as 
its pricing strategy, it will bid $45 for the product in the market. Besides price strategy, 
buyers have to make a capacity choice at the same time. The processor’s capacity ratio is 
 (2.2)                                        ])/[( NcRQx CCC ×−= , 
where Cx is the capacity ratio, CQ is the processing capacity of the buyer, and N is the 
total number of sellers. Buyers choose capacity ratio to plan processing quantity. For 
example, if the capacity cost if $10, with total sellers number N = 400 and R = $100, the 
sellers will provide 36,000 under buyers’ perfectly competitive condition. Thus, if one 
buyer plans to process 3,600 products, its processing strategy is to use 10% as its capacity 
ratio.   
 
Simulation Design with Particle Swarm Optimization Algorithm 
The idea of PSO came from watching the way flocks of birds, fish or other 
animals adapt to avoid predators and find food by sharing information. The difference 
here is that each buyer has a separate “flock of birds” that does not share information 
with the flocks of the other agents.  
We set up K parallel markets and letting the agents each have their own clones in 
every market. Although having the same behavior rules, one agent and its K clones may 
take different market strategies since the initialized random values are different. In the 
simulation, buyers dynamically change their marketing strategies with the PSO algorithm 
but sellers are price takers and simply sell their products to the current highest bidders.  
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Considering agents continuously changing their strategies, the local best solutions 
may not be the best for the current period. Thus, we adjust the PSO by retesting the past 
best locals of each clone under current market environment and choose the best fit as the 
current best local among these best locals and the current strategy. 
 
Particle Swarm Optimization Algorithm 
First we describe the generic particle swarm optimization algorithm. Table II-1 
shows the pseudo code of the PSO algorithm. Every clone has a strategy parameter 
set xwhich is randomly initialized at the beginning of the simulation. Each strategy in the 
set has an adjustment velocity, ]1,1[,, +−∈
Γ
tkiv , which determines the change of the choice 
variable, the superscriptΓ indicates bid price or capacity strategy in the decision set. The 
velocity change of a strategy parameter for a clone is a function of the local best solutions 
achieved in its own market, ]1,0[, ,, ∈
Γ l
tkip , and its global best solution among all the 
parallel markets, ]1,0[,, ∈
Γ g
tip . The superscripts l and g indicate local and global, the 
subscripts k and i indicate the thk  parallel market and thi agent respectively. The profit 
function )( ,, tkik xπ is used to value the performance of the choice variable set tki ,,x . 
In every simulation step, each new choice variable of the thi agent in the 
th
k parallel market can be updated by the following equation:  
 (2.3) ΓΓΓ
+ += tkitkitki vxx ,,,,1,, , 
and the velocity is modeled as: 












tkitkitki xpucxpucwvv , 
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where Γ tkiv ,, is the velocity, ]1,0[∈ju , 2,1=j are uniformly distributed random numbers, 
1c and 2c are learning  parameters and are called self confidence factor and swarm 
confidence factor respectively, and w is an inertia weight factor. 
The following equations describe how to choose an agent’s local best and global 
best. As stated in the introduction, we adapt the PSO by retesting the best locals. In our 
research, the new best local is chosen from the best locals of the previous L periods and 
the strategy tki ,,x of the current period:  
 (2.5) { }tkiitkikl Ltkikl tkikl tki ,,',,,,1,,,, )(),(),......,(maxarg ≠−−= xxppp πππ , 
where 'i indicates opponents, π is profit. The different past best locals of each agent 
in L periods will be reevaluated under the current t period economic environment by 
holding other agents’ strategies in this period unchanged. The profits will be compared 
with that of that of the current strategy. The one with the highest profit is the new local 
best. Just like in real economic markets, the market information will be revealed to 
participants. The best global parameter is selected from the best locals: 
 (2.6) { })(,),(),(maxarg ,,2,,21,,1, l tKiKl til tigti pppp πππ K= . 
 Chatterjee and Siarry (2006) state that the inertia weight w in (2.3) is critical for 
the PSO’s convergence behavior. A large inertia weight provides larger exploration than 
a smaller one. So it is worth making a compromise and letting w start with a higher value 
at the beginning and then decreasing w as the optimization proceeds:  
(2.7) ( ) maxmax10 / tttw
ww
t −+= ββ , 
where both w0β and
w
1β are constants, maxt is the maximum number of iterations and t is the 
current iteration. Similarly, we set 1c and 2c  in equation (2.4) as: 
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(2.8) ( ) maxmax10,2,1 /11 tttcc
cc
tt −+== ββ , 
where both 10
cβ and 11
cβ are constants. 
This research also studies an oligopsony market where agents make combinatorial 
decisions on both capacity and price, so buyers have a combinatorial strategy set instead 
of one choice variable. Each clone of a buyer chooses a capacity-price ratio set 
x ]',[ Cb xx=  as a combinatorial strategy in each parallel market, ]1,0[∈Γx , Γ  = b, C.  
 
Equilibrium Criterion 
Zero diversity in the strategies of all parallel markets for every agent can be used 
to signal the stopping point for PSO. Diversity diminishes with time which causes the 
same strategy to dominate among all parallel markets. In our simulation, for all agents, if 
the variance of the strategies in the population is less than 0.01% and the mean value of 
the strategies for 10 iterations is less than 0.01%, we say the algorithm is converged.  
 
Summary of Simulation Procedure 
We test three oligopsony markets (duopsony, triopsony and 4-buyer market) as 
well as a monopsony market. For each market structure, two capacity cost scenarios 
(zero, $30) are considered. Buyers choose bid price or quantity and bid for product 
simultaneously, and improve the combinatorial strategy set with PSO at the end of each 
period.  
We design the artificial markets with PSO by setting up K = 20 parallel markets 
and buyers and their clones trade in all markets simultaneously and independently. The 
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retest iteration number L is chosen as 10. The number N of sellers is 400 among all 
experiment settings. The simulation steps are described as follows. 
(i) For the first L beginning iterations, randomly initialize strategy set x for all 
buyers in every parallel market. We choose the quantity and price 
ratio ]1,0[,, Ux tki ∈
Γ and the movement 
velocities 0,, =tkiv for Mi ,...,1= , 2,1=Γ , Kk ,...,1= , and Lt ,...,1= . 
(ii) Buyers update their capacity ratio and price ratio respectively with equations 
(2.3) and (2.4). 
(iii) Within each parallel market, supply first goes to the current highest bidder up 
to the buyers’ capacity. If more than one buyer bids the same price, then a 
sharing rule is assumed. Then the remaining supply goes to the second 
highest bidder up to its capacity and so on. 
(iv) After the first L iterations, each buyer retest the past L best locals under 
current economic environment and compare their performance with that of 
the current strategy, the best among them is selected as the new best local, as 
equation (2.5) shows. 
(v) Following equation (2.6), the best fit among all best locals is the best global.  
(vi) If the market does not reach equilibrium, go to step (ii). 
 
Simulation Settings 
We simulate markets with and without a capacity cost. Under each capacity cost 
scenario we simulate markets with different numbers of buyers, which are monopsony, 
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duopsony, triopsony, and a 4-buyer market and there are 8 alternative settings in total. 
The market and algorithm parameters used in the simulations are listed in Table II-1.  
One simulation round contains multiple iterations in which agents trade with each 
other repeatedly. Within each round, agents play the game repeatedly and learn to find 
the best response strategy set until the market reaches equilibrium or meets the maximum 
2000 iterations constraint. Considering the randomness of the learning path, each setting 
is run 100 rounds with different randomly initialized starting strategies for all agents. 
Once equilibrium is reached, the average value of the last 20 iterations for the market 
price and the agent’s strategies are used as the market equilibrium values. The mean and 
standard deviation of the market equilibrium values of the 100 rounds are used to 
characterize market equilibrium. Theoretically, the price of monopsony and perfect 
competition levels are 2/)( CcR −  and CcR − respectively. The monopsony and perfect 
competition price are $50 and $100 when there is no capacity cost; and are $35 and $70 
with the $30 capacity cost. 
 
Simulation Results 
The mean and standard deviation of the equilibrium strategy parameters for each 
scenario are shown in Tables II-2 and II-3. Actual quantity ratio is defined 
as ])/[( NcRq C ×− , here q is how many products it actual purchased with its price-
quantity combinatorial strategy set in the market.  
Table II-2 shows that without capacity cost, market prices are at the monopsony 
level always for markets with1 or 2 buyers, mostly for 3 buyers, and almost never for 4 
buyers. From monopsony to triopsony, the more buyers in the market, the higher the 
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market price is but only by a small amount. The market average price of $53.29 for the 
triopsony market is only a little higher than $50.07 for duopsony market. Buyers fight to 
nearly perfect competition level when the market contains 4 buyers with market price 
$99.98. Without capacity cost, buyers tend to maintain a capacity much higher than the 
actual market aggregate supply from monopsony to triopsony, and near to the actual 
market aggregate supply for the 4-buyer market. The actual quantity variances for one 
buyer are around 17% in triopsony market and much higher than around 5% in duopsony 
and around 3% in 4-buyer markets.  
Table II-3 shows that when there is a capacity cost, the duopsony buyers still 
collude to nearly the monopsony level but the triopsony buyers compete to near the 
perfectly competitive level. The average market price of $36.63 in the duopsony market 
is slightly higher than the monopsony price of $34.99 and the market price of $69.41 in 
the 4-buyer market is a little higher than the triopsony market price of $68.88. With 
capacity cost, buyers make capacity plans more carefully. Especially for the monopsony 
market, the buyer plans its capacity to exactly match the quantity it actually gets in the 
market. For markets containing more than one buyer, excess capacity still exists but is 
smaller for duopsony and 4-buyer markets than the triopsony market.  
Table II-4 presents the market price in equilibria under different experimental 
settings. Under market equilibrium, if the actual quantity ratio that a buyer gets is less 
than 5%, we say it is inactive in the market and the other active players share the 
supplies. Then we calculate the percentage of each category out of the equilibrium of 100 
simulation rounds. The results in Table II-4 show that capacity cost causes the markets to 
have more varied equilibria than without capacity cost and the profit decreases 
 39 
considerably because of the excess capacity of processors. The duopsony and 4-buyer 
markets continue to collude and compete, but the competition in the triopsony market 
becomes more severe and the players compete to a higher price level or even the perfect 
competition price. Without capacity cost, the duopsony buyers always collude and the 
buyers in the 4-buyer market always compete to the perfectly competitive level and the 
equilibrium for the two markets are stable. The triopsony buyers collude to the 
monopsony price level with mostly 2 players active in the market, with a small chance of 
having only one player left. When there is a capacity cost, the multiple equilibria 
phenomena exist for all three markets. For the duopsony market, though buyers still 
mostly collude, a few times they compete to a higher market price level and sometimes 
there is only one buyer active in the market. The competition in the 4-buyer market with 
capacity cost is less severe than without capacity cost. In the 4-buyer market, there is a 
small chance that one or two players do not get any products and the remaining buyers 
share the supply. The capacity cost in the triopsony market causes the players in it to 
compete to a higher price level or even the perfectly competitive level instead of collude 
to the monopsony level as they usually do without capacity cost.  
Figure II-1 shows the frequency of equilibrium market prices out of the 100 
simulation runs for each market setting. According to the market design, with or without 
a $30 capacity cost, the monopsony market price levels are $50 and $35, and perfect 
competition price levels are $100 and $70 respectively. The results show that for the 
duopsony market without capacity cost, the market price is mostly exactly the 
monopsony level or a little bit higher. With capacity cost, the equilibrium price of the 
duopsony market mostly locates slightly higher than the monopsony level of $35 and 
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scatters larger than without cost. For the triopsony market, market equilibrium prices are 
tend to be a few dollars higher than the monopsony level without a capacity cost but tend 
to the perfect competition level with capacity cost.  
Figure II-2 shows the frequency of the buyers’ actual capacity ratios in each 
market setting. We put the actual capacity ratio of all buyers at equilibrium for all 100 
simulation runs together, separate them into different ranges and draw their distribution. 
For example, for the results of 100 simulation runs of the triopsony market, there are 300 
equilibrium actual capacity ratios total for all three players. If there are 30 ratios in the 
range 22.5%-27.5%, we say the frequency of this range is 10% among all possible 
equilibrium actual capacity ratios.  
Figure II-2 (a), (e) and (f) show that for the duopsony market without capacity 
cost and the two 4-buyer market settings, there is mainly one equilibrium for each market 
and buyers tend to split the supply. For the duopsony market with a capacity cost, as 
Figure II-2(b) shows, about 8% of the time one buyer does not purchase any product and 
the remaining buyer dominates, but most of the time the buyers split the market share. 
For all three markets, the actual capacity ranges scatter larger with capacity cost than 
without cost.  
Figure II-3 shows individual runs to illustrate the pricing behavior evolution of 
buyers with no capacity cost setting. This figure shows that monopsony and 4 buyers 
markets reach equilibrium faster than duopsony and triopsony markets. In this example, 
all buyers have the same pricing strategy. When the number of buyers is less than 4, they 
collude to monopsony and otherwise they compete to the perfectly competitive level. 
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This phenomenon shows that when there are more than 3 players in the price competition 
market, they have little chance to collude and will compete to perfect competition level.   
 
Conclusions  
This research studied the procurement behavior of oligopsony buyers with 
capacity-price combination decisions. When buyers can learn from their past 
performance and make strategic decisions with some randomness, buyers collude to 
nearly the monopsony level for duopsony market and compete to nearly the perfect 
competitive level when the market contains four buyers. For triopsony, the equilibrium 
price level increases from monopsony to the near perfectly competitive level when a 
capacity cost is added. Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (2004) obtain similar results with 
quantity competition experiments with human subjects. They also find that the number of 
buyers affects the competitive behavior and two buyers tend to collude and four buyers 
tend to be competitive. The results also show that buyers tend to have excess capacity. 
This phenomenon can be observed in the beef packing industry, where the processing rate 
is only around 70% of the buyers’ total capacity.  
The results show that computer-based adaptive algorithms can mimic how firms 
adapt their behavior under strategic price-quantity competition markets and present a 
potential explanation of the phenomena observed in experiments with human subjects 
which differ from the predictions of or cannot be explained by existing theoretical models 
with fully rational agents. This suggests that people use heuristic learning rules, which 
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Table II-1. PSO Parameters in the Artificial Market Simulation 
 
Parameter     Symbol Value 
Market Parameters 
Number of firms M 1 for monopsony market; 
2 for duopsony market; 
3 for triopsony market; 
4 for 4-packer market 
Number of sellers N  400  
Product value R $100  
   
Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) Algorithm Parameters 
 
Intercept of inertia weight in equation (2.7) of PSO 
w
0β  1.5 
Slope of inertia weight in equation (2.7) of PSO w1β  0.5 
Self and global confidence factors of PSO 21 cc =  1  
Number of parallel market K 20  
Maximum iteration of one simulation round maxt  2,000  
Number of simulation round  100  
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Buyer 1 Mean 50.00 50.00% 83.31% 50.00% 249,990 Monopsony 
 SD   0.00   0.00% 14.20%   0.02%          89 
        
Buyer 1 Mean 50.07 50.06% 84.71% 25.53% 127,442 
 SD   0.07   0.07%   9.96%   5.53%   27,550 
Duopsony 
Buyer 2 Mean  50.06% 84.40% 24.54% 122,523 
  SD    0.07%   9.41%   5.52%   27,543 
        
Buyer 1 Mean 53.59 53.55% 85.49% 16.36% 75,762 
 SD   1.24   1.24% 14.30% 17.17% 79,333 
Buyer 2 Mean  53.57% 87.47% 20.45% 94,954 
 SD    1.24% 12.77% 17.01% 79,138 
Triopsony 
 
Buyer 3 Mean  53.56% 84.78% 16.78% 77,843 
  SD    1.24% 13.38% 15.29% 70,998 
        
Buyer 1 Mean 99.98 99.98% 96.31% 25.42%         39 
 SD   0.00   0.00%   3.70%   3.05%         10 
Buyer 2 Mean  99.98% 95.62% 25.16%         40 
 SD    0.00%   5.39%   3.12%         10 
Buyer 3 Mean  99.98% 95.82% 24.43%          39 
 SD    0.00%   4.76%   3.14%            10 
Buyer 4 Mean  99.98% 96.24% 24.92%          37 
Four-Buyer 
 
 SD    0.00%   4.19%   3.21%          10 
Note:  
1. Marginal capacity cost is zero, which is Cc  = 0. 
2. Price ratio is the bidding price of a buyer relative to CcR − = $100 here; for example, 
50% price ratio means this buyer will bid with $50. 
3. Capacity ratio is the processing quantity plan of a buyer relative to NcR C ×− )( = 
10,000; for example, buyer 1’s capacity ratio is 83.30%, and actual capacity ratio is 





















Monopsony  Buyer 1 Mean 34.99 49.99% 49.99% 49.99% 122,483  
  SD   0.02 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 17  
        
Duopsony  Buyer 1 Mean 36.63 52.30% 52.05% 24.78% 565  
  SD   0.21 0.30% 0.82% 13.00% 56,911  
 Buyer 2 Mean  52.31% 51.88% 27.53% 13,172  
  SD  0.29% 2.64% 12.98% 57,366  
        
Buyer 1 Mean 68.88 98.36% 85.99% 32.16% -110,629  
 SD   0.95 1.34% 23.55% 29.35% 68,434  
Buyer 2 Mean  98.38% 84.14% 32.18% -106,707  
 SD  1.35% 23.75% 24.67% 62,054  
Triopsony  
 
Buyer 3 Mean  98.37% 86.89% 33.79% -108,781  
  SD  1.35% 21.14% 26.82% 60,707  
        
Buyer 1 Mean 69.41 97.64% 55.28% 23.79% -65,040  
 SD   0.69 3.46% 9.34% 8.90% 14,433  
Buyer 2 Mean  97.55% 56.39% 25.37% -64,166  
 SD  4.13% 9.84% 8.67% 16,560  
Buyer 3 Mean  97.40% 54.31% 23.75% -63,050  
 SD  5.08% 10.13% 8.65% 15,863  
Buyer 4 Mean  97.41% 56.30% 24.21% -66,371  
Four-Buyer  
  
 SD  4.61% 9.26% 9.03% 16,560  
Note:  
1. Marginal capacity cost is $30, which is Cc  = $30. 
2. Price ratio is the bidding price of a buyer relative to CcR − = $70 here; for example, 
50% price ratio means this buyer will bid with $35. 
3. Capacity ratio is the processing quantity plan of a buyer relative to NcR C ×− )( = 
7,000; for example, buyer 1’s capacity ratio is 83.30%, and actual capacity ratio is 
49.98%  means it plans to purchase 8,330 products but actually get 4,998 in the 
market. 
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Table II-4. Equilibria under Different Market Settings 
 


















Duopsony 1     8.5%   
 2 100%    88.5%  3% 
         
Triopsony 1 5%     9% 7% 
 2 95%     29% 13% 
 3      28% 14% 
         
4-Buyer 1        
 2      1%  
 3      4%  
 4  100%    75% 20% 
Note:  
1. The percentage in this table presents the frequency of an equilibrium among 100 
simulation rounds under each setting. 
2. Under zero capacity cost setting, market price between $98.5 and $100 are looked as 
perfect competition level. 
3. Under $30 capacity cost setting, market price between $68.5 and $70 are looked at as 





a. Duopsony market without capacity cost b. Duopsony market with $30 capacity cost 
 
c. Triopsony market without capacity cost 
 
d. Triopsony market with $30 capacity cost 




a. Duopsony market without capacity cost b. Duopsony market with capacity cost 
  
c. Triopsony market without capacity cost d. Triopsony market with capacity cost 
  
e. Four-buyer market without capacity 
cost 
f. Four-buyer market with capacity cost 
 
Figure II-2. Frequency of buyers’ actual capacity ratio 
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(a) Monopsony market                                             (b) Duopsony market 
 
 
(c) Triopsony market                                 (d) 4-buyer market 
 













 THE LONG RUN AND SHORT RUN IMPACT OF CAPTIVE SUPPLIES ON 
SPOT MARKET PRICE: AN AGENT-BASED ARTIFICIAL MARKET 
Introduction 
In the beef packing industry, vertical integration through captive supplies between 
packers and feeders has increased significantly during the past decades. Captive supplies 
include marketing agreements, packer owned cattle, and forward contracts. Most packers 
procure cattle both through exclusive captive supply contracts and from the spot market. 
According to a recent GIPSA Livestock and Meat Marketing Study (USDA 2007), 38.3% 
of cattle were purchased with captive supplies, from which marketing agreements take 
the largest share of 28.8%, with 4.5% forward contracted, and the rest packer owned. The 
price of captive supply cattle is typically linked to the subsequent spot market price in 
one way or another. In addition to the increased vertical integration, the U.S. beef 
processing industry also experienced horizontal integration with the four-firm 
concentration ratio reaching 80% in 2002 (Ward).  
The increased use of captive supplies by oligopsony packing firms has led to 
concern about negative impacts of captive supplies on the cash market. Xia and Sexton 
(2004) construct a theoretical duopsony market where packers purchase cattle both with 
exclusive captive contracts and in the cash market, and the price of captive supplies is 
 52 
linked to the spot market price. They show that packers can use captive supplies to reduce 
competition and depress the cash market price to the monopsony level if 50% of the 
cattle are contracted. In contrast to the large price depression predicted by Xia and 
Sexton’s theoretical model, previous empirical studies have found that captive supplies 
have only a small negative or insignificant effect. Ward, Koontz and Schroeder (1998) 
find small negative relationships between price and the percentage of cattle delivered 
with forward contracts and marketing agreements. Parcell, Schroeder and Dhuyvetter 
(1997) find that a 1% increase in captive supply shipments is associated with a $0.02/cwt 
and $0.03/cwt reduction in basis in Colorado and Texas. USDA (2007) gives similar 
results as the previous empirical studies and shows that a 10% increase in capacity 
utilization through captive supplies is associated with a $0.04 per pound of carcass 
weight decrease in the cash market.  
One possible explanation of the difference between Xia and Sexton’s static model 
and the previous empirical results is that price depression from captive supplies is a short 
run effect. In the long run, if packers reduce the price they pay for cattle, contracted 
feeders will reduce the number of cattle they produce. While the Xia and Sexton result is 
mathematically correct, its assumptions may not match what happens in actual cattle 
markets. In this article, we demonstrate that the extra market power provided by captive 
supplies is a short run phenomenon. 
In this research, we use the agent-based computational economics (ACE) method 
to study the fed cattle market by conducting experiments with programmed agents. 
Agent-based computational economics (ACE) simulates games between interactive 
agents (Tesfatsion 2001) and adopts concepts and methods from game theory, cognitive 
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science and computer science. ACE models are increasingly used to study economic 
phenomena and are especially suitable to simulate economic games in which agents 
interact with each other assuming bounded rationality and simple adaptive learning rules.  
ACE has been used to study the behavior of agents in the cobweb model, the 
exchange rate problem, prisoner’s dilemma, etc. (Ariforic 1996; Axelrod 1987; Erev and 
Roth 1998; Riechmann 2001; Vriend 2000), but to our knowledge, has not been used in 
agricultural economics. ACE can be used to study problems with simple behavioral 
assumptions that are too difficult to analyze with mathematical methods. ACE is more 
economical and time efficient compared to experiments with human subjects and it is 
more controllable.  
This research uses a particle swarm optimization algorithm to model the learning 
behavior of agents in the artificial fed cattle market. PSO is a stochastic optimization 
technique developed by Eberhart and Kennedy (1995). The idea of PSO came from 
observing how flocks of birds, fish, or other animals adapt to avoid predators or to find 
food by sharing information. In our game, packers do not cooperate with each other and 
only learn from their own experience. Thus, we adjust PSO by constructing multiple 
parallel markets and letting each agent have its own clones in every market. Agents trade 
in every market simultaneously and independently, but they learn from their experience 
with their own clones. This means each packer has a separate “flock of birds” that does 
not share information with the flocks of the other agents.  
In this research, we develop an artificial fed cattle market using an agent-based 
model and use it to determine the impacts of captive supplies under different short run 
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and long run contract assumptions. We verify that price depression impact of captive 
supplies exists in the short run, but find that it disappears in the long run.  
 
The Oligopsony Market with Captive Supplies 
Consider a homogeneous product market with M packers and N  feeders. The 
number of packers is much less than the number of feeders ( NM << ). Packers procure 
from feeders and sell processed goods to the retail market. To focus our research on the 
game between packers and feeders in this market, we assume that the final processed 
boxed beef price, the processing rate, and the marginal cost are constant, so the fed cattle 
value to packers is also constant. This result means the marginal revenue for each animal 
is constant, and we define the marginal revenues as R .  
 Packers first make contracts with chosen feeders and then compete for the 
remaining cattle in the spot market. We follow Xia and Sexton’s assumption that packers 
use quantity as their competition strategy. The market prices are determined by the 
packers’ total demand in the spot market and the aggregate supply from the non-
contracted feeders. In this section, we construct three scenarios by first fixing both the 
number of contracts and the quantity per contract. Next, we allow supply response by 
feeders. Finally, we allow supply response and let packers choose the number of captive 
supply contracts. The agent-based models under the three assumptions are developed in 
the next section. The simulation result with the agent-based model is compared with the 
theoretical result.  
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Fixed Number of Contracts and Fixed Quantity per Contract 
We first present a theoretical model that extends the Xia and Sexton (2004) 
results. Xia and Sexton only consider the duopsony case, but we generalize their results 
to the oligopsony case of M packers.  
 Assume M processing packers and N feeders in the fed cattle market. Packers 
purchase cattle from feeders with both exclusive contracts and in the spot market. The 
price of contracted cattle is linked to the spot market price. Packers choose quantities 
rather than price and so this is a Cournot game. 
Assume packers make exclusive contracts with cin chosen feeders, and the quantity 
of each contract ciq is fixed, where c indicates contract market. In each period, the 
contracted feeders deliver cattle to packers and packers compete with each other for cattle 
from the non-contracted feeders. The spot price is determined by the market clearing 
price from the spot market aggregate demand and supply, and the contracted cattle are 
also valued with this price. Feeders always accept the contracts. We use S to indicate the 




inS 1 and NS < .  
At the beginning of each processing period, packers make procurement strategies 
simultaneously and then purchase cattle in the spot market. The choice variable of the 





ti ×= , 
where dtix ,  is the procurement ratio, N is the total number of feeders, and the superscript d 
indicates packer’s demand in the spot market. Packer i ’s processing quantity diq is also the 
amount of its procurement. R is the marginal revenue of one packer and also the supply 
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level of feeders under the perfect competition price level. For example, if under perfect 
competition, all feeders will provide 10,000 cattle and the processing quantity of 
packer i is 3,000, its procurement ratio ix equals 0.3.  






t qQ 1 , . We assume 
all feeders are homogeneous and have a linear supply function t
s
tj pq =, , so the total 
supply in the spot market is t
s
t pSNQ )( −= , since the contracted S feeders deliver all 
their products with contracts. The market clearing condition is where the spot market 
aggregate demand equals supply, which is dt
s




tt −= . 
 Packer i ’s total profit, which is determined by the quantity it purchases both with 




titti qnqpR +−=π , Mi ,...,1= . Because 
the quantity per contract is fixed, the contract quantity ciqn is constant for each processing 
period. Thus in every period, packers only need to decide how many cattle to buy through 
the spot market to maximize their profit. In addition, since we know that packers’ 
procurement decisions will also affect the spot market price, we substitute equation (3.2) 
into the packers’ profit function and solve its first order conditions with respect to dtiq , , 










ti qnqSNRq −−−= ∑
≠
, for all Mi ,...,1= . 
Simultaneously solving these reaction functions of M packers, we obtain the spot demand 
quantities for each packer: 
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ti , for Mi ,...,1= . 







t qQ 1 , into equation (3.2), and the spot market clearing price is 
(3.5) )])(1/[()1/( SNMSqMMRp
c
t −+−+= . 
From this result, we can see that without captive supplies, which means S = 0, the 
equilibrium price is the Cournot oligopsony level. With captive supplies, the price is 
lower than without them.  
 Now we assume the contracted feeder does not have a supply response and 
quantity cq is agreed to be fixed to a value. We assume that the fixed quantity per contract 
will be based on the long run equilibrium price. Thus, packers and contracted feeders fix 
the quantity of a captive contract to Ep . Substitute Epq c = to equation (3.5), which 
results in: 
(3.6) ])1/[()( MSNMRSNMEp −+−= . 
If the oligopsony model is restricted to be a duopsony model by setting M = 2, 
this spot market price becomes )23/()(2 SNRSNEp −−= , which is same as equation (5’) 
in Xia and Sexton (2004). In addition, when the total MNM /)1( − number of feeders sign 
captive contracts and agree to produce at the market price level, the spot market price 
reaches the monopsony level R/2. For example, when there are M = 4 packers in the 
market, they need to make exclusive contracts with 3N/4 feeders to depress the spot 
market to the monopsony level. In Xia and Sexton’s duopsony model, packers only need 
to contract with S = N/2 feeders to depress the spot market price to the monopsony level. 
These results illustrate that the larger the number of packers, the larger number of 
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aggregate exclusive contracts that are needed to depress the spot market price the same 
amount. 
 From the above results, we can see that the spot market price could be depressed 
to the monopsony level, when both the number of contracts and the quantity per contract 
are fixed. 
 
Fixed Number of Contracts and Flexible Quantity per Contract 
 Now relax the previous model by allowing a supply response from contracted 
feeders. Other assumptions are the same as with the previous model. M packers and N 
feeders in the market, and the total contracted feeder number is S. The spot market price 
is the same as equation (3.2). 
We assume that the contracts are made one period ahead and that contracted 
feeders will produce the quantity based on the expected spot market price of the delivery 
period. Thus, the supply equation of the contracted feeder is adjusted as t
s
tj Epq =, . 





titti qnqpR +−=π  ))(( , ti
d
tit EpnqpR +−= , Mi ,...,1= . When the market 
reaches equilibrium, the spot market prices between different time periods will be the 
same, which means tt pEp = . Substitute this condition and equation (3.2) into the profit 
function, and take the first order condition with respect to the packers’ procurement 












ti nSNqnSNRSNq +−+−−−= ∑
≠
, for all Mi ,...,1= . 
Simultaneously solving these reaction functions of M packers for the aggregate demand 
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∑= dtid qQ ,  in the spot market and then substitute the result in the market clearing 
equation (3.2), we get the spot market clearing price in equilibrium as 
(3.8) ]2))(1/[(])[( SSNMSMSNREp +−++−= . 
From this result, we can see that without captive supplies, which means S = 0, the 
equilibrium price is still the Cournot level. If we restrict the oligopsony model to be a 
duopsony model by setting the number of packers M = 2, this spot market price 
becomes )3/()2( SNSNREp −−= , which is higher than that in the previous model. For 
example, when S = N/2, the spot market price is 3R/5, which is higher than the 
monopsony level R/2 but lower than the duopsony level 2R/3.  
 From the results above, we can see that with a fixed number of contracts and with 
supply response, the spot market price level is higher than without supply response. But, 
in this model captive supplies still reduce market prices.  
 
Flexible Contracts and Flexible Quantity per Contract 
Now assume that in the long run feeders who sign captive supply contracts have a 
supply response and packers can adjust their captive supply contract numbers and the 
procurement quantity in the spot market.  
First, packers decide how many feeders to make exclusive contracts with. The 





ti /,, = , 
where ctix , is the contract ratio of packer i , which indicates the percent of feeders out of the 
total number of feeders with whom this packer contracts in time t. Then feeders decide 
 60 
how many cattle they will produce based on their expectation of the market price. We can 
reasonably assume that feeders expect the spot market price of the next period will be the 
same as the current one. Thus, with a linear supply function that has an intercept of zero 
and a slope of one, feeders will deliver 1−= t
c
t pq to their contracted packers. At last, 
packers decide how many cattle to process with strategy qx and compete with other 












tit pnqpR , for all Mi ,...,1= . 
The maximization of the above functions involves variables in multiple time 
periods and the current period contains two choice variables for each packer. Solving 
such a dynamic model with mathematical analysis would be difficult. Therefore, we use 
an agent-based model to simulate this market. In the following section, we introduce the 
market design of the agent-based model for an artificial oligopsony market with captive 
contracts. 
 
Agent Based Artificial Fed Cattle Market with PSO Algorithm 
An agent-based model is a computer simulation artificial market which contains 
multiple programmed strategic agents interacting in an economic market system. These 
agents have simple behavioral rules and can learn to use better strategies based on their 
past experiences. 
In this article, we use programmed intelligent agents acting as N feeders and M 
packers in the fed cattle market. Feeders are price takers, and packers compete for cattle 
both with captive supply contracts and in the spot market. The transactions between 
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packers and feeders occur in a captive contract market and in a cash market. We set up 
three simulation procedures: a) fixed number of contracts and fixed quantity per contract; 
b) fixed number of contracts and flexible quantity per contract, and c) flexible number of 
contract and flexible quantity per contract. Figure III-1 illustrates how packers and 
feeders dynamically make their transactions under these market designs.  
In the simulation, we assume that packers choose quantities and that market 
participants discover the interception point of the current aggregate demand and supply 
curve and use it as the market clearing price. Thus, if no captive supply is present, the 
simulation results should be exactly what the Cournot theory predicts. Since packers 
cannot form enforceable agreements, if any market power is exercised which makes the 
spot market price lower than the Cournot result, it must be done through captive supply. 
The following paragraphs describe the market mechanisms of each market and the 
behaviors of agents in them. Market participants have their own marketing strategies and 
can improve their performance by learning based on their past performance.   
Figures III-1(a) and (b) show the time lines with short run and long run periods. In 
the short run, we assume that both the captive contract and the quantity per contract are 
fixed. Under this assumption, we simulate the behavior of packers to show how they 
adjust their spot market procurement quantity to find the best response level. This process 
means that during the short run simulation, packers only have one choice variable, the 
procurement ratio in the spot market. Different from the short run model, Figure III-1(b) 
shows that in the long run, packers can select the number of contract feeders as well as 
the procurement ratio in the spot market. Also, contracted feeders have a supply response 
with respect to the spot market price.  
 62 
The learning behaviors of packers are modeled with a particle swarm optimization 
algorithm. By playing the game repeatedly, packers can learn from their own experiences 
and adopt the best strategy for themselves.  
 
Particle Swarm Optimization Algorithm 
To model the adaptive learning of agents, evolutionary (genetic algorithm) and 
machine learning (reinforcement learning) algorithms are increasingly applied to ACE 
(Ariforic 1994; Axelrod 1987; Erev and Roth 1998). With GA, researchers have to be 
very careful to choose parameters and methods for each problem or the result may be 
premature convergence. The large population size also makes finding equilibrium with 
GA time consuming. Reinforcement learning is a sub-area of machine learning, and the 
environment is typically formulated as a finite state Markov decision process in which an 
agent increases the probability of choosing successful strategies under the possible 
strategy spaces of its rivals. When the possible strategy space is large or continuous, the 
computational cost increases exponentially. To avoid the problems of GA and RL, we use 
a particle swarm optimization algorithm to model the learning behavior of agents. As we 
state in the introduction section, agents have their own parallel clones and share 
information between them. This kind of marketing strategy can be observed in many real 
markets. For example in fed cattle market, packing firms send many agents to purchase 
cattle from feeders and each of them visits feeders in a certain area. Agents bid 
differently but they will share information with their colleges at the end of each period 
and adjust their strategies to increase profit. This sharing of information does not occur in 
GA, and this may explain why PSO has been found to lead to faster convergence.  
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In the market simulated here, agents face a changing economic environment since 
all agents continuously update their market strategies. We set up K parallel markets, and 
agents each have their own clones in every market. For example, with 20 parallel 
markets, agents each have 20 clones as the population from which they can learn. 
Although having the same behavioral rules, the K clones of one agent may take a 
different strategy in each market since the initialized random values are different. In the 
simulation, packers dynamically change their marketing strategies with the PSO 
algorithm but feeders are price takers and simply sell their products at the market price.  
Suppose the thk clone of packer i  chooses Γkix , as one of its two strategy 
parameters, ]1,0[, Ux ki ∈
Γ , and each strategy parameter is randomly initialized at the 
beginning of the simulation, hereΓ indicates a strategy in the decision set of a clone. Each 
clone has a velocity, ]1,0[, Uv ki ∈
Γ , which determines the change of the strategy value. The 
changes of choice variables are influenced by the value of the best solutions achieved by 
the thk clone itself, ]1,0[,, Up
l
ki ∈
Γ , and by the best solution among the whole 
population, ]1,0[, Up gi ∈
Γ . The superscripts l and g indicate local and global, the 
subscripts k and i indicate thk  parallel market and thi packer respectively. Profit 




kiki xx=x . 















tkitkitki xpucxpucvwv , 
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where Γ tkix ,, indicates the strategy, 
Γ
tkiv ,, is the velocity vector, ]1,0[Uu ∈ζ , and 2,1=ζ are 
uniformly distributed random numbers, 1c and 2c are learning parameters and can be 





,Γ are local best and global best, and the subscript ofΓ is d or c 
to indicate strategy x as procurement ratio or contract ratio. The calculated value 
of Γ +1,, tkix or 
Γ
+1,, tkiv  is restricted to be one or zero when it overflows the range.  
The following equations indicate how to choose lkip
,
,
Γ  and gip
,Γ among all 
parameters of agent i . Under a dynamic environment where agents’ best response 
strategy depends on how others behave, the fitness value of the previous local best may 
not be the same when it is used in the current economic environment. Then the local best 
needs to be retested. The best locals of the previous L iterations are retested under the 
current market environment. The current best local is choosen from the best performance 
past parameters l tkip
,
',,
Γ  and the current strategy: 
(3.13) { }Γ≠Γ−−Γ = tkiitkikl Ltkikl tkikl tkip ,,',,,,1,,, ,, )(),(,),(maxarg xxpp πππ K , 
where Kk ,...,2,1= and 'i indicates packer i ’s rivals. And the best global parameter is 
selected from the best local parameters: 
(3.14) { })(,),(maxarg , ,,, t1,,1,, l tKiKligtip ΓΓΓ = pp ππ K , 
where K is the total number of parallel markets. 
 The inertia weight w in (3.12) is critical in affecting the speed of convergence 
(Chatterjee and Siarry 2006). A large inertia weight provides a larger exploration but a 
slow convergence, while a smaller inertia weight is needed to fine-tune the current search 
area. It is worth making a compromise, such as starting with a higher value at the 
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beginning and then decreasing w with iterations:  
(3.15) ( ) maxmax10 / tttw
ww
t −+= ββ , 
where maxt is the maximum number of iterations and t is the current iteration. Self 
confidence and global confidence factors 1c and 2c in equation (3.12) can be set as 
constant and are usually between 0.5 and 2.5. Here we choose 1 for both of them.  
 
Simulation Procedure with PSO 
There are M packers and N feeders. Each packer and feeder has K clones in the K 
parallel markets. Each clone of a packer may have a different trading strategy in each 
parallel market. The steps in the simulation are: 
(i) In each market, randomly initialize Γ tkix ,, and
Γ
tkiv ,, for all i . We choose the 
quantity ratio ]1,0[,, Ux tki ∈
Γ and 0,, =
Γ
tkiv for all Mi ,...,1= , Kk ,...,1= , and 
Lt ,...,1= . 
(ii) Select the best locals for each clone with equation (3.13). 
(iii) Select best global for each packer with equation (3.14). 
(iv) While the market is not converged, each packer continuously uses the 
function (3.11) and (3.12) to select new strategies.  
 
Equilibrium Criterion 
Typically, zero diversity in the population's strategies among all markets signals 
the stopping point for a PSO. As the population evolves, diversity diminishes and each 
agent uses the same strategy in each parallel market. For every agent, if the variance of 
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the strategies in the population is less than 0.01% and the variance of the mean value of 




We design two scenarios under the short run assumption by simulating with and 
without a supply response from the feeders with fixed captive supply contracts, and one 
scenario under the long run assumption by simulating with flexible captive supply 
contracts. In each scenario, we determine the market equilibrium of a duopsony market 
and an oligopsony market containing 4 packers. Thus, in this research we have 12 
simulation settings. 
The parameters used in the three scenarios are shown in Table III-1. The market 
parameters and PSO parameters are the same for all scenarios and the packer number M 
is 2 in the duopsony markets and 4 in the oligopsony markets. We have 400 feeders in 
each market. The cattle value before processing is $100 for packers. For the PSO 
algorithm, we choose 1.5 and 0.5 for the intercept w0β  and slope
w
1β of inertia weight w in 
equation (3.15), and let the maximum iteration maxt be 500. Both 1c and 2c in equation 
(3.12) are chosen as constant value 1 with 20 parallel markets. For the two short run 
scenarios, since we assume that the captive supply contracts last for infinite periods with 
or without contract quantity fixed, we also set the values of these two variables as 
parameters, and the chosen values are shown in Table III-1.  
A simulation round contains multiple iterations that agents repeatedly play the 
game until the market reaches equilibrium. We run 100 rounds for each of the 12 
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experimental settings with different random starting values. Within each simulation 
round, we let agents trade until the equilibrium is determined by the convergence 
criterion or a maximum of 500 iterations is reached. At the beginning, packers randomly 
choose their strategies and learn to use better strategies based on their experience.  
In the short run simulation, the captive contracts are fixed, and packers interact in 
the market to find the optimal procurement strategies with or without quantity per 
contract fixed. We simulate the market by letting packers contract with 50% and 75% of 
feeders in the duopsony market and the four packer market respectively. Since packers 
are homogeneous, we can reasonably assume that packers will split the contracts equally, 
and each of them will contract with 25% of the total feeders in the duopsony market and 
18.75% in the 4 packer market. In the short run setting without contract supply response, 
we set the quantity per contract as 50. According to our theoretical derivation, if packers 
contract with (M-1)N/M feeders and the contract quantities are fixed at the monopsony 
level R/2, packers can depress the spot market price to the monopsony level. So we use 
this setting to test if packers in the artificial market can learn to find the optimal 
procurement strategies to benefit from the monopsony price in the spot market. Thus, in 
the short run simulation, packers have one choice variable - the procurement ratio; but in 
the long run, they have two choice variables - the contract ratio and the procurement 
ratio. 
The mean and standard deviation of the market price and packers’ strategies at 
equilibrium from 100 rounds are calculated. The simulation results are shown in Table 
III-3. The results show that in the short run, packers can depress the spot market price to 
the monopsony level of $50 for both the duopsony market and the oligopsony market; but 
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in the long run, packers compete to obtain the Cournot results, and the spot market price 
is $66.7 in the duopsony market and around $80 in the 4-packer market. In addition, 
when packers can choose both the number of captive supply contracts and the 
procurement quantity in the spot market, packers most often use the spot market to 
purchase cattle. This result means that in the long run, packers cannot use captive 
contracts to depress the spot market price, and packers behave like they do not need 
captive supplies as an alternative procurement method. 
Besides the statistical analysis of the market equilibrium, Figures III-2 to III-5 
show the dynamics of the spot market price and the packers’ strategies in an individual 
run under each experimental setting. Figure III-2 shows the market prices for the 
duopsony and 4-packer models under the long run assumption and the short-run 
assumption with a fixed contract without contract supply response. From Figure III-2, we 
can see that if packers make long term contracts with feeders and the quantity of 
contracts are fixed to a carefully chosen value, they can depress the spot market price to 
the monopsony level of $50 even without collusion. However, without long term 
contracts where packers adjust strategies on both captive supply and spot market 
procurement, the spot market price goes to the Cournot solution.  
Figure III-3(a) shows the simulation results of the duopsony market under fixed 
contracts without contract supply response. The figure shows that at equilibrium, each 
packer uses a procurement ratio of 12.5% as its optimal strategy, which yields 5,000 spot 
market procurement quantities according to equation (3.1) since R and N equal $100 and 
400. Thus, the total demand in the spot market is 10,000. Substituting this quantity and 
the number of uncontracted feeders of 200 into equation (3.2), we see that the market 
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price is $50. This result is consistent with our simulation results in Figure III-1 and the 
theoretical results of Xia and Sexton (2004).  
 Following the method above, we simulate the four-packer market by letting 
packers make contracts with 75% of the total feeders. The contract quantity is also fixed 
at 50. The simulation results in Figure III-3(b) show that the market reaches equilibrium 
when each packer uses a spot procurement ratio around 3.125% as its strategy. Substitute 
these values into equation (3.5), and we can also get the market price as $50. These 
results are consistent with our simulated results in Figure III-2. The results confirm that 
when the market contains more packers, the packers need to contract with more feeders 
than the duopsony market to depress the spot price to the monopsony price level.  
 Both Figures III-4 and III-5 show the simulation results for markets without fixed 
contracts. Under this situation, packers adjusted the number of feeders they contract with 
as well as the spot procurement strategies. Also, contracted feeders are allowed to have a 
supply response. In long run markets, packers show oligopsony behavior. The spot 
market plays a crucial role, and packers tend to purchase all demand in it instead of the 
captive supply market, and the contract ratio goes to zero. Packers use 33.33% and 20% 
spot market procurement ratios in the two markets respectively which is consistent with 
the results of the traditional Cournot model without captive supply markets.  
 There is no price depressing effect of captive supplies, but that is because packers 




An agent-based model is used to study the impact of captive supplies under fixed 
or flexible contracts. With a fixed number of contracts with or without supply response, 
analytical solutions are available. But for the long run scenario with flexible contracts and 
flexible quantity per contract, the solution cannot be found with mathematical analysis 
and an agent-based simulation method is used. The agent-based model has been used in 
economics but is new to agricultural economists. This model provides an alternative 
method to study the complex problems which are difficult to solve with mathematical 
analysis and less costly than experiments with human subjects.  
Our simulation results indicate that captive supplies can depress the spot market 
price in the short run if the contracts are fixed. This result is consistent with Xia and 
Sexton’s model. But this is a short run effect. In the long run when the packers can adjust 
the number of contracts and feeders have a supply response for contract quantity, the 
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(a). Fixed number of contracts and with or without captive supply response 
 
(b). Long run model with flexible number of contracts and captive supply response 
Figure III-1. The timeline of the model 
In the spot market, 
packers purchase 









produce cattle and 




priced with the 
spot market price. 
 
In the spot market, 
packers purchase cattle 
based on their 
procurement strategies.  
 
Each of the contracted 
feeders delivers cattle 
to packers. 
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Figure III-2. Spot prices of duopsony and four-packer markets 
 
Note: For the two short run settings, both the number of contracts and quantity per 
contract are fixed. 
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(a). Duopsony Market 
 
(b). Four-Packer Market 
Figure III-3. Packers’ short run procurement ratio in the spot market without 
contracts supply response 
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(a). Contract Ratio 
 
(b). Spot Procurement Ratio 
Figure III-4. Packers’ strategies in duopsony market under long run assumption 
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(a). Contract Ratio 
 
(b). Spot Procurement Ratio 
Figure III-5. Packers’ strategies in four-packer market under long run assumption 
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Table III-1. Parameter Setting in Artificial Market Simulation Design 
  
Parameter            Symbol Value 
 
Market Parameters 
Number of Packers M 2 for duopsony market; 
4 for four-packer market 
Number of Feeders N 400 
Cattle Value Before Processing R $100 
   
Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) Algorithm Parameters 
Intercept of inertia weight in equation (3.15) 
w
0β  1.5 
Slope of inertia weight in equation (3.15)  w1β  0.5 
Self and global confidence factors of PSO 21 cc =  1  
Number of parallel markets K 20 
Maximum iteration of one simulation round maxt  500 
   
Parameters for Model with Fixed Contracts 
Number of contracted feeders for each packer cn  N/4 for duopsony market; 
3N/16 for four-packer market 
Quantity per captive supply contract 
c





Table III-2. Short Run and Long Run Simulation Results of Market Prices and Packers’ Strategies under Duospsony Market 
and Four-Packer Oligopsony Market Settings 
 
Short Run Market 
Structure 
Packer Statistic 





















 Mean 50.00   60.00   66.76    
 SD   0.00   0.00     0.54    
Packer 1 Mean  12.50% 500,000  15.00% 480,000  1.55% 32.45% 444,000 
 SD    0.00% 0    0.00% 0  1.52%   0.90% 7,539 
Packer 2 Mean  12.50% 500,000  15.00% 480,000  1.89% 32.14% 443,000 
Duopsony  
 SD    0.00% 0    0.00% 0  1.15%   0.76% 4,702 
 Mean 50.00   66.41   80.20    
 SD   0.01   1.20     0.41    
Packer 1 Mean  3.13% 250,000  4.12% 218,000   0.83% 19.48% 159,500 
 SD   0.00% 0  0.34% 9,515   0.79%   0.42% 2,236 
Packer 2 Mean  3.13% 250,000  4.15% 219,000   1.22% 19.07% 158,500 
 SD  0.00% 0  0.36% 7,182   0.93%   0.83% 4,894 
Packer 3 Mean  3.13% 250,000  4.20% 220,500   1.16% 19.32% 160,000 
 SD  0.00% 0  0.25% 8,256   0.97%   0.58% 3,244 
Packer 4 Mean  3.13% 250,000  4.14% 219,500   1.16% 19.16% 159,000 
Four-Packer  
 SD  0.00% 0  0.25% 8,870   1.05%   0.99% 3,078 
Note: 
1. In the short run duopsony market, each packer uses a fixed captive contract ratio of 25% , which means it contracts with 100 
feeders in every iteration period;  
2. In the short run four-packer market, each packer uses a fixed captive contract ratio of 18.75% , which means it contracts with 75 
feeders in every iteration period; 
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complex economic problems that are hard to solve with mathematical methods. 
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competitive level; but the triopsony market changes from mostly monopsony to 
perfect competition when capacity cost increases from zero to a higher level. The 
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